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Most-Favored-Nation Treatment in Soviet-
American Trade Relations
E.T. USENKO*
In the practice of international relations a number of legal princi-
ples and norms have been worked out, which constitute a legal regime
for the promotion of trade and other economic relations between
countries. Prominent among these principles and norms is the most-
favored-nation principle. Its application to a definite sphere of eco-
nomic (and sometimes other) relations among countries creates the
system of legal rules and legal conditions called the most-favored-
nation treatment. The significance of this treatment in international
trade is so great that without its establishment and observance nor-
mal relations cannot exist between the countries concerned.
This is strikingly demonstrated by Soviet-American trade during
the entire period after World War II, when the United States, in spite
of the 1937 agreement on most-favored-nation treatment, instituted
a number of discriminatory measures in its trade with the Soviet
Union' and thereby denounced the agreement itself. For many years
Soviet-American trade was close to the zero level.2 Even in recent
years, despite the relaxation of discriminatory measures, trade be-
tween the two countries could not develop normally in view of the fact
that it was not based on most-favored-nation treatment. In 1971, for
instance, trade between the U.S.S.R. and the United States was only
one-quarter of the volume of the trade between the U.S.S.R. and
Japan, or that between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of
Germany, although the economic potential and resources of the
United States and the U.S.S.R. are incomparably greater than that
of Japan or Germany.
This situation brought the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the
United States to the conclusion that it was necessary to raise the level
of the economic links between the two countries. They came to an
understanding that these links should develop on the basis of mutual
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benefit and in accordance with accepted international practice.3 The
logical outcome of this understanding was the Trade Agreement of
October 18, 1972, whose main purpose is to establish the most-
favored-nation treatment. Together with the other documents signed
at that time, this Agreement, to quote U.S. Secretary of Commerce
Peterson's pronouncement at a press conference on October 19, 1972,
will put an end to the abnormal trade relations that existed between
the U.S.S.R. and the United States during the past 25 years.'
Since one can find various definitions of the most-favored-nation
principle, it would be expedient to give from the very beginning what
we feel is the most clear-cut definition of that principle. The most-
favored-nation principle means that international treaties contain a
clause under which each signatory country pledges to accord the
other signatory country, in areas of their relations delineated in the
treaty, the rights, privileges, advantages, and benefits that it accords
or will in the future accord to any third country. The formula "what
it accords or will in the future accord to any third country" embraces
the treatment enjoyed by a third country regardless of whether it is
based on an international treaty, a national law, or actual practice.5
Moreover, from the very outset it must be stressed that most-
favored-nation treatment should not be confused or identified with
non-discrimination. The principles underlying these concepts are dif-
ferent. The substance of the principle of non-discrimination is the
right to demand similar conditions as those enjoyed by all countries,
i.e., conditions common to all. On the other hand, the substance of
the most-favored-nation principle is the right to demand the most
favorable, beneficial, and privileged conditions. Most-favored-nation
treatment thus presupposes non-discriminatory treatment but is not
reduced to it.
Further, the principle of non-discrimination is the general out-
come of the sovereign equality of countries. It has the character of a
mandatory, common legal norm and therefore does not require treaty
recognition. However, as an international-legal norm the most-
favored-nation principle is of a treaty character. With regard to non-
discrimination, the U.N. International Law Commission stated quite
clearly on one occasion that it is a general rule stemming from the
equality of states,' and on another occasion that it is a general rule
3. Joint Soviet-American Communique on Trade and Commercial Relations,
Pravda, May 31, 1972, at 1, col. 3; 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 899, 900 (1972).
4. Pravda, Oct. 20, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
5. Ustor, (Third) Report on the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, U.N. Doc. A/C.N.
4/257 (1972).
6. Commentary to Article 44, in Sandstrom, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Inter-
course and Immunities, [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89, 105, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/116
Add. 1, 2.
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stemming from the sovereign equality of states.7
In Soviet trade treaty practice the most-favored-nation clause is
applied unconditionally. Prior to World War I the United States ad-
hered to the principle of conditional most-favored-nation treatment,
under which the benefits received by a third country applied to a
signatory country only if it accorded the other signatory country the
same rights and privileges that the latter received from the aforesaid
third country (the principle of equivalence or compensation). After
World War I (for the first time in the trade treaty with Germany in
1923) the United States began to implement the principle of uncondi-
tional most-favored-nation treatment.' However, with some countries
the old treaties founded on the principle of reciprocity are still in
force. In this connection it is important to note that under Article I
of the Soviet-American Trade Agreement of 1972 the parties accorded
each other "unconditional," i.e., absolute most-favored-nation treat-
ment. This means that in according the other signatory country the
privileges it accords to any third country, each party to the agreement
cannot demand an "equivalence" or "compensation" on the grounds
that such an "equivalence" or "compensation" is received by it from
a third country.
The basic object of the most-favored-nation clause is the defini-
tion of its scope or, in other words, the areas of its application. Under
Article 1 of the Soviet-American Agreement the most-favored-nation
clause must be applied by each of the parties to goods imported from
the other country or exported to the other country in all questions
relating to:
a) all customs tariffs levied on imports or exports or in connection
with imports or exports, including the method of levying such tariffs;
b) internal taxes, marketing, distribution, storage, and use;
c) dues on international remittances of payments for imports or ex-
ports;
d) rules and formalities linked with imports and exports.
It must be noted that in many of the treaties signed by the
U.S.S.R. and the United States with third countries, the area of
operation of the most-favored-nation clause is considerably wider. In
the Soviet Union's treaties with some countries provision is made, for
example, for the application of the most-favored-nation clause to all
7. Commentary to Article 70 of the Draft Articles on Consular Intercourse and
Immunities, in Int'l L. Comm'n Report, [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 88, 128, U.N.
Doc. A/4843.
8. Leites, 0 sisteme naibol'shogo blagopriatsvovania (The Most-Favored-Nation
System), [1915] 42 VESTNIK FINANSOV, PROMISHLENNOSTI I TORGOvLI 218; 2 HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1504 (2d ed.
1951); SNYDER, THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE: AN ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REF-
ERENCE TO RECENT TREATY PRACTICE AND TARIFFS 243 (1948).
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questions of trade and shipping Moreover, in treaties with a number
of countries use is made of the all-embracing formula "in all ques-
tions related to trade and shipping, as well as other forms of economic
relations between the two countries.'
0
Thus, in areas not covered by the Soviet-American agreement,
commercial relations may prove to be under less favorable conditions
than the conditions enjoyed by some other countries in their eco-
nomic relations with the U.S.S.R. or, correspondingly, with the
United States. For that reason it is not to be ruled out that as the
commercial links between them expand the two countries may be
confronted with the need for enlarging the area of operation of the
most-favored-nation principle.
The question of exceptions to the principle is of immense signifi-
cance for the effective operation of the most-favored-nation mecha-
nism. Inasmuch as most-favored-nation treatment is a treaty clause,
the contracting parties must define its scope. Consequently, the ex-
ceptions established by the parties which narrow the scope of most-
favored-nation treatment, or exclude various relations from its opera-
tion, are quite consistent with the nature of the agreement.
The matter is more complicated when exceptions are made with
reference to third countries to which a contracting party accords var-
ious benefits and privileges. In principle, such exceptions run counter
to the idea of most-favored-nation treatment. For that reason allow-
ance for them is made only where it is necessitated by custom or by
the specific status of the country to which such privileges are ac-
corded.
Among the exceptions provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 1 of
the Soviet-American Trade Agreement the most notable is the exclu-
sion of the privileges accorded to "neighboring countries with the
object of facilitating border trade." This exception is quite common
in trade treaties because it would be inappropriate to apply to all
areas of foreign trade the privileges established for border trade,
which are quite specific. Also consistent with treaty practice is the
provision in Article 8 of the Agreement that most-favored-nation
treatment would not limit the right of each of the parties to take any
action to safeguard its security.
9. Soviet-French Agreement on Trade Relations and on the Status of the Trade
Mission of the U.S.S.R. in France of September 3, 1951, art. 1 in SBORNIK TORGOVYKH
DOGOVOROV. TORGOVYKH I PLATEZHNYKH SOGLASHENII I DOLGOAROCHNYKH TORGOVYKH SOG-
LASHENII S.S.S.R. S INOSTRANNYMI GOSUDARSTVAMI (COLLECTION OF TRADE TREATIES,
TRADE AND PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS AND LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
U.S.S.R. AND FOREIGN STATES) 736 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as TRADE
TREATIES].
10. See, e.g., Treaty on Trade and Shipping of September 27, 1957 between the
U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic, art. 2, TRADE TREATIES 200.
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By virtue of paragraph 3 (ii) of Article 1 of the Agreement the
most-favored-nation clause does not cover any of the preferences that
each of the signatory countries accords through its recognition of
Resolution 21 (11), adopted by UNCTAD on March 26, 1968, which
recognizes the need for the speediest introduction of a system of gen-
eral preferences in favor of the developing countries without reciproc-
ity and without discrimination. This resolution was adopted by UNC-
TAD in view of the acute need for creating favorable trade and politi-
cal conditions that could accelerate the economic advancement of the
developing countries.
All these exceptions are quite clear. However, certain special
restrictions established by the Soviet-American Agreement merit a
more detailed examination.
Paragraph 3 (iii) of Article 1 of the Agreement exempts from the
requirement of most-favored-nation treatment any action by either
government which is permitted under a multilateral trade agreement
of which it is a signatory at the time of the signing of the Agreement,
with respect to the products originating in or exported to a country
which is a signatory of the multilateral agreement. It must be under-
scored that paragraph 3 (iii) of Article 1 provides for the possibility
of extending to the other country rights and privileges granted to a
co-signatory of a multilateral trade agreement insofar as the multilat-
eral agreements would permit such extensions.
This provision is evidently a reference to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, of which the United States is a signatory. That
agreement, which is based on the most-favored-nation principle and
on mutual tariff concessions, allows for certain exceptions to this
principle. We feel that for Soviet-American trade relations real signif-
icance may attach to the right, envisaged by GATT, that, in order
to ensure its external financial position and balance of payments, any
signatory may limit the quantity or price of imported goods provided
it observes certain conditions that protect the interests of the other
signatories.
From what we have said regarding paragraph 3 (iii) of Article 1
we may draw the following conclusions:
1. The U.S.S.R. and the United States act on the general rule that
the most-favored-nation treatment established by the Agreement signed
by them covers the corresponding advantages and privileges that have
been or may be established by any multilateral international agreement.
This must be emphazised in view of the fact that in scholarly literature"
we sometimes encounter the misguided opinion that the privileges estab-
lished by a multilateral agreement allegedly do not come under the opera-
tion of the most-favored-nation clause in treaties between signatories and
11. STRUPP-SCHLOCHAUER, 2 WOERTERBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 501-502 (1961).
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non-signatories of a multilateral agreement.
2. The privileges established by a multilateral trade agreement for
its signatories may be excluded from the most-favored-nation treatment
only if the multilateral agreement was in operation on the day the Soviet-
American Trade Agreement was signed. As any other exception to a
general rule, this provision cannot be applied extensively. It means, in
particular, that it may not be proliferated to other multilateral agree-
ments that may be signed after that date.
3. Inasmuch as the paragraph in question in fact implies GATT and,
more specifically, its provisions on the right of signatory countries to
introduce restrictions in order to ensure their external financial position
and balance of payments, it must be noted that this exception is fre-
quently encountered in trade treaty practice. We may cite, for example,
Article 7 of the Soviet-Japanese Trade Treaty of December 6, 1957.1
4. In accordance with paragraph 1 (iii) of Article 1 of the Soviet-
American Agreement, and in accordance with general treaty practice,
restrictive actions are subject to the principle of non-discrimination.
The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 1, which concern quanti-
tative restrictions, must evidently be included among the special
exceptions to the most-favored-nation clause. Under that paragraph
each of the parties pledges that in the event it applies quantitative
restrictions on exports or imports with regard to third countries it will
accord the goods of the other party treatment that is equitable in
relation to the treatment it accords to third countries.
A comparison between this rule and the rule established in para-
graph 3 (iii) of Article 1 allows us to draw the conclusion that the
former applies to cases where restrictions are applied in general to
third countries, i.e., in principle to all third countries, while the latter
can be applied in instances provided for by multilateral agreements
to a limited number of countries. Inasmuch as paragraph 2 of Article
1 has in mind the restrictions applied in principle to all third coun-
tries, "equitable" treatment in the spirit of the Soviet-American
Trade Agreement must imply at least common non-discriminatory
treatment in the given matter. If in such a case any country or coun-
tries were given privileged treatment, then most-favored-nation
treatment would be "equitable" treatment.
The exceptions to the most-favored-nation principle envisaged in
Article 3 of the Agreement are quite specific. Under that Article each
of the parties may take such steps as it considers necessary to ensure
that goods from the other side are not imported in such a quantity
or on such terms as would call forth or intensify the dislocation of the
internal market or create a threat of such dislocation. Essentially,
this is an anti-dumping clause, which is unusual in Soviet trade
treaty practice. This clause is not included in treaties signed by the
U.S.S.R. because dumping, a weapon in trade war, is alien to the
12. TRADE TREATIES 869.
VOL. 5:243
MFN TREATMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
Soviet Union, which pursues a policy of promoting normal trade with
all countries, with the result that the U.S.S.R.'s trade partners have
no grounds for fearing dumping by the U.S.S.R. Equally, the Soviet
Union has no grounds for fearing dumping by its foreign partners, for
it is adequately protected against this by the state monopoly of for-
eign trade.
We therefore feel that in Soviet-American commercial relations
the reservation in Article 3 will not and cannot have any practical
significance. Its presence in the Soviet-American Trade Agreement is
probably due to the U.S. practice of treaty relations with third coun-
tries. In this aspect it has a formal significance: the countries whose
treaties with the United States contain that reservation will thus be
unable to assert that in this respect the Soviet Union has been ac-
corded more favorable treatment.
In assessing the provisions on most-favored-nation treatment in
the Soviet-American Trade Agreement it must be said that by and
large they conform to accepted international practice. We stress this
point particularly because in the Joint Soviet-American Commu-
nique accepted practice is indicated as a standard for the trade rela-
tions between the two countries.' 3 We regard this Communique and
the "Principles of Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A."' 4
as fundamental documents for understanding and interpreting all the
supplementing treaties and the norms stated in these treaties.
The unswerving observance of the most-favored-nation princi-
ple, as well as of more general principles of international relations
such as sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and
mutual benefit, will create legal guarantees for the stable develop-
ment of commercial relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States.
At the same time, we must pinpoint the obligation of the two
countries, stated in Article 2 of the Agreement, to take, in accordance
with the laws and regulations in operation in each country, appropri-
ate measures to encourage and facilitate exchanges of goods and serv-
ices on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Agreement. On the basis of such joint efforts by the two
countries it is expected that Soviet-American trade will show very
high rates of growth, as envisaged in the Agreement (an increase of
at least 200 percent as compared with the period 1968-1971).
The change that has taken place in the climate of Soviet-
American relations following the Moscow talks between Soviet lead-
13. Joint Soviet-American Communique, supra note 3.
14. Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 898 (1972).
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ers and the U.S. President led to a perceptible activation of trade
even in 1972; it almost doubled to reach the sum of half a billion
rubles. 5 However, it was still far short of the potentialities of the two
countries. In 1972 its volume did not reach the level even of Soviet-
Finnish trade. The years 1973 and 1974 witnessed a further expansion
of Soviet-American trade. However, in 1972, as in 1973 and 1974,
Soviet-American trade grew chiefly through Soviet purchases. But,
as N.S. Patolichev, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, told a
TASS correspondent, Soviet-American trade must develop in both
directions "for without this, trade can have no prospects."' 6 Only the
speediest introduction of most-favored-nation treatment can open
broad prospects for the growth of mutually beneficial trade between
the Soviet Union and the United States.
15. Patolichev, Sovetskaia vneshniaia torgovlia: rol' i perspektivy (Soviet Foreign
Trade: Role and Prospects), Pravda, Mar. 9, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
16. Pravda, Oct. 21, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
